PUBLICATIONS
Agency, Power, and Injustice in Metalinguistic Disagreement (2021).
The Philosophical Quarterly
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Unjust power often affects the kinematics of metalinguistic disagreement, and this results in distinctive forms of epistemic and linguistic injustice.
Rethinking Epistemic Appropriation (2021).
Episteme
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Epistemic appropriation often involves obscuring the epistemic resources of marginalised communities (owing to active ignorance).
Gaslighting, First and Second Order (2020).
Hypatia
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Second-order gaslighting occurs when there is a disagreement over which concept should be used in a context, and the disagreement causes a speaker to doubt their interpretive abilities in virtue of doubting the accuracy of their concept.
Revision, Endorsement, and the Analysis of Meaning (2020).
Analysis, Co-Authored with Kai Tanter.
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Conceptual engineering is consistent with the idea that meaning claims are prescriptions for usage.
Privileged Groups and Obligation: Engineering Oppressive Concepts (2019).
Journal of Applied Philosophy
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Privileged groups have an obligation to significantly aid in the processes that give rise to the amelioration of oppressive concepts.
Ideology and Normativity: Constraints on Conceptual Engineering (2019).
Inquiry
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Epistemic loss in conceptual engineering is permissible when the ameliorated concept can causally influence the world to make itself accurate.
What Defines a Conceptual Resource? (2019).
Ergo
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What relationship must hold for a set of concepts to be the conceptual resource of a group of people…?
Hermeneutical Injustice and Animal Ethics: Can Non-Human Animals Suffer From Hermeneutical Injustice? (2018).
Journal of Animal Ethics
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Non-human animals can suffer from other-oriented hermeneutical injustice.
A Linguistic Method of Deception: The Difference Between Killing Humanely and a Humane Killing (2018).
Journal of Animal Ethics
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The meat-eating industry employs moral language to exploit our moral sensibilities.
There’s No Such Thing As Conceptual Competence Injustice. (2017).
Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, Co-Authored with William Tuckwell.
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There are three reasons for thinking that conceptual competence injustice is not in fact a novel form of epistemic injustice.