Agency, Power, and Injustice in Metalinguistic Disagreement (2021). 

The Philosophical Quarterly

  • Unjust power often affects the kinematics of metalinguistic disagreement, and this results in distinctive forms of epistemic and linguistic injustice. 

Rethinking Epistemic Appropriation (2021).


  • Epistemic appropriation often involves obscuring the epistemic resources of marginalised communities (owing to active ignorance).

Gaslighting, First and Second Order (2020).


  • Second-order gaslighting occurs when there is a disagreement over which concept should be used in a context, and the disagreement causes a speaker to doubt their interpretive abilities in virtue of doubting the accuracy of their concept.

Revision, Endorsement, and the Analysis of Meaning (2020).

Analysis, Co-Authored with Kai Tanter.

  • Conceptual engineering is consistent with the idea that meaning claims are prescriptions for usage.

Privileged Groups and Obligation: Engineering Oppressive Concepts (2019).

Journal of Applied Philosophy

  • Privileged groups have an obligation to significantly aid in the processes that give rise to the amelioration of oppressive concepts.

Ideology and Normativity: Constraints on Conceptual Engineering (2019). 


  • Epistemic loss in conceptual engineering is permissible when the ameliorated concept can causally influence the world to make itself accurate.

What Defines a Conceptual Resource? (2019).


  • What relationship must hold for a set of concepts to be the conceptual resource of a group of people…?

Hermeneutical Injustice and Animal Ethics: Can Non-Human Animals Suffer From Hermeneutical Injustice? (2018).

Journal of Animal Ethics

  • Non-human animals can suffer from other-oriented hermeneutical injustice.

A Linguistic Method of Deception: The Difference Between Killing Humanely and a Humane Killing (2018).

Journal of Animal Ethics

  • The meat-eating industry employs moral language to exploit our moral sensibilities.

There’s No Such Thing As Conceptual Competence Injustice. (2017).

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, Co-Authored with William Tuckwell.

  • There are three reasons for thinking that conceptual competence injustice is not in fact a novel form of epistemic injustice.